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Approved For Release 2003/08/48 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001100060006-0

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

29 October 1959

11/5/59

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allen W. Dulles  
Director of Central Intelligence

Subject: Presentation of the 1959 Net Evaluation Subcommittee  
Report

1. It has been decided that the 1959 report of the Net  
Evaluation Subcommittee will be deferred in its presentation  
until next spring.

2. The Director of the Staff, Net Evaluation Subcommittee,  
has been instructed to be prepared to present the report of the  
1959 Net Evaluation in April or May of 1960 and to cancel plans  
for the conduct of a 1960 Net Evaluation.

*N. F. Twinning*

N. F. TWINING  
Chairman  
Net Evaluation Subcommittee

cc: Mr. Gordon Gray  
Lieutenant General Hickey

TS-NES-961-3-59

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of 1 pages series -

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NSC review(s) completed.

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TS 172494 #1

30 October 1959

11/57.59

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Present Plans of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff

1. Attached hereto is a letter from General Twining indicating that the report of the 1959 Net Evaluation will not be presented to the President until April or May of 1960. This is the evaluation which was begun a year ago; the war game has been completed and the staff will begin in a week or two to draft the written report.

2. The report on the 1959 Net Evaluation would normally be completed in November and presented orally at the White House in December. Following immediately thereafter, the staff would have begun a new study. The President has informed General Twining, however, that he would prefer to receive the 1959 report in the spring and that this was the only report he desired before expiration of his term.


3. General Twining has therefore instructed General Hickey not to undertake a 1960 evaluation, and he is writing to you in his capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee to advise you of his instructions to General Hickey.

4. The President's decision naturally raises the question of whether the staff should be continued after it has submitted the 1959 evaluation. I believe it is General Twining's opinion that the staff should be kept together until the new administration can decide whether it desires the net evaluation studies to continue. In order to keep the staff employed, General Twining and General Hickey appear to believe that an evaluation, to be presented in 1961, should be initiated by the Subcommittee on its own responsibility next spring after presentation of 1959 report. It is also their view that, during the months between now and April, the staff will - in addition to completing the 1959 report - engage in general orientation and planning looking toward a 1961 report.

5. During the past three months the staff has been heavily occupied with preparation of the special target study for the Joint Chiefs of Staff which was begun this past spring. As you will recall, this was not a Subcommittee project but the use by the JCS of the staff's experienced personnel. CIA supplied the intelligence input, but you, as a member of the Subcommittee, are not responsible for the report itself. That report was passed to General Twining on 30 October. Presumably, if the staff is not heavily occupied over the next several months, the JCS may again resort to it for special studies of one kind or another.

6. I have been with the staff a comparatively short time, and I have not become as well qualified as my predecessors to express a judgment about the desirability of continuing the staff or the Subcommittee on a tentative basis pending the decision of a new administration. From what I have seen I have begun to entertain doubts on this score. The conclusions of the evaluations over the past several years have been strikingly similar, and it seems to me would be unlikely to change unless some major technological change occurred. The conclusions add up essentially to one thing: we would be very badly battered, and the USSR would be more so. Moreover, the procedures of the exercise have become very elaborate and complex; the staff work seems to have become thoroughly enmeshed in a system. If these kinds of studies were desired in the future, a new staff could be assembled with perhaps fresh ideas and less tendency toward repetition of old formulas.

7. I am not prepared to make a recommendation to you now regarding continuation of the Subcommittee, the staff, or CIA representation on the staff. I do believe, however, that these questions ought to be considered seriously in a few months time. I will report to you any further developments, but I would like to reserve a specific recommendation until after the first of the year.



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Attachment

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Cabell

The Director would like to speak to you and [redacted] about the attached. An appointment is being set up which is convenient to you and the Director. \*

\* Meeting scheduled for  
2:30, 5 November. K-

JSE

31 October 59

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(DATE)

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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY
SOURCE		CIA CONTROL NO.
<b>Twining NSC</b>		<b>172494</b>
DOC. <b>TPS-NES-961-3-59</b>		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE <b>29 Oct 59</b>		<b>10/30/59</b>
COPY NO. <b># 1</b>		LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES <b>1</b>		<b>25X1</b>
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS		
<b>None</b>		

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